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Abstract 
Disability rights activists have been trailblazers in the public debate about prenatal genetic 
testing. They provide meaningful critique about whether such testing should be offered and, 
more importantly, guidance about adequately and appropriately informing decision-makers. This 
paper illuminates the rhetorical devices that the disability and medical communities use in policy 
statements to frame the issues surrounding prenatal genetic screening and testing. The qualitative 
analysis focuses on how these stakeholder groups imitate and engage the abortion conversation 
in both form and content, particularly in their use of the language of choice. As medical 
communities begin to create practice guidelines surrounding emerging genetic technologies and 
their implementation into prenatal care, disability rights organizations have a timely opportunity 
to re-engage these conversations. Policy statements may help to rally allies and to make 
Disability Studies and disability rights perspectives active in the public sphere. 
Keywords: prenatal diagnosis; Down syndrome; health policy; personal autonomy; 
choice behaviour 
 
 
Les militantes en droits des personnes ayant un handicap ont fait preuves de pionier-ères dans les 
débats publics à propos des tests génétiques prénataux. Ils ont formé une critique utile quant à 
savoir si de tels tests devraient être offerts ou non; ce qui est plus important encore, ils ont offert 
des directives pour informer de manière adéquate et appropriée ceux et celles qui doivent prendre 
cette décision. Cet article  clarifie les procédés de rhétoriques utilisée dans leurs énoncés de 
politiques, d’une part par les communautés de personnes handicapées, et d’autre part par la 
communauté médicale, afin de structurer  la discussion à propos du dépistage et des tests 
génétiques prénataux. L’analyse qualitative qui est employée ici permet de concentrer notre 
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attention sur la façon qu’on ces parties prenantes d’imiter et d’interagir avec les débats sur 
l’avortement, tout particulièrement lorsqu’ils utilisent le langage du choix. Maintenant que la 
communauté médicale développe de nouvelles directives de pratique et de mise en œuvre pour 
les technologies génétiques émergeantes dans les soins prénataux, les organisations pour la 
défense des droits des personnes handicapées se trouvent idéalement placées pour relancer ces 
conversations. Les énoncés de politiques peuvent aider à rallier les allié- es à cette cause, et à 
rendre plus actifs dans la sphère publique les études critiques sur le handicap ainsi que les 
perspectives des organisations pour les droits des personnes handicapées. 
Mots-clés: dépistage prénatal; Trisomie 21; politique de santé; autonomie individuelle; 
modélisation du choix 
 
 
 
 
  
CRITICAL DISABILITY DISCOURSE/  83 
DISCOURS CRITIQUES DANS LE CHAMP DU HANDICAP 6 
 
 
Public Choices:  
An Examination of Policy Statements about Prenatal Testing 
Introduction 
In the public sphere, the abortion debate has co-evolved with that of prenatal testing; at 
about the same time as North America began questioning the legality of abortion, genetic testing 
for Down syndrome entered clinical practice (Morgentaler v. The Queen, 1976; Nadler, 1968; 
Roe v. Wade, 1973). Historically, amniocentesis – the “gold” standard for prenatal diagnosis – 
was only offered to women over the age of 35 because the risk of having a child with Down 
syndrome increases with age. The procedure has some risk of digit, limb, or even pregnancy loss 
(Eddleman et al., 2006). Since the 1970s, technological advances have reduced these associated 
risks, and new medical procedures allow for similar diagnostic capacity using a maternal blood 
sample (Lo et al., 1998). For some, the results of such testing may shape decisions about 
pregnancy management. 
Arguments in favor and in opposition of the availability of prenatal genetic testing have 
focused on women’s reproductive choice and ultimately fallen into the discursive strategies used 
in the ongoing public conversation about abortion. Many pro-life groups object to abortion on 
moral and philosophical grounds, affording rights to a fetus that the state should protect; 
conversely, pro-choice advocates argue that a pregnant woman’s rights trump any that might be 
afforded to a fetus. This polarized debate raises questions about whether abortion should be 
legally allowed and whether public funds ought to support such services. 
The moral and political issues related to abortion can become distractions from the 
alternative, yet pressing questions of whether prenatal genetic screening and testing should be 
offered and, if so, how and what procedures should be offered. They also raise related questions 
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about who ought to be offered such testing, when, for what purpose, and for whose benefit. At 
the intersections of clinical practice and public health, such questions bring to the foreground 
broader issues about access to healthcare services, as well as social expectations about family 
and parenting. 
Building upon previous scholarly works that have looked at the bioethical and rhetorical 
dimensions of prenatal genetic testing (Lippman & Wilfond, 1992; Potter et al., 2008; Press & 
Browner, 1994; Seavilleklein, 2009; Wilkinson, 2008), this paper extends this conversation by 
taking into consideration key stakeholders. As Varvasovszky and Brugha (2000) describe in 
relationship to health policy and planning, stakeholders are actors who have an interest, are 
affected, or can influence a particular issue. Due to their differing characteristics, I have selected 
the disability and medical communities. Both share interest in this issue and policy will impact 
both; however, disability communities have less power in decision-making than their medical 
counterparts. Clinical practice guidelines inform practice and policies. In contrast, the disability 
communities’ position statements most notably impact practice via prospective parents (i.e., 
prospective parents receive such messages through the media, critically assess the issues at stake, 
and may be compelled to take personal action). The disability and medical communities hold 
seemingly oppositional positions: the medical communities support current practice, while the 
disability communities oppose it. I utilize the plural term “communities” to describe both 
disability communities and medical communities in order to acknowledge the diversity within 
each broad category. For example, the disability communities include people with disabilities 
(both with and without prenatally identifiable conditions), their families, disability rights 
activists, and their allies. On the other side, the medical communities include physicians (both 
those with specialized genetic training and those without), allied health professionals, healthcare 
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policymakers, and healthcare insurers and payers. Thus, these communities’ policy statements 
reflect a variety of positions related to prenatal testing. This embedded diversity of attitudes and 
opinions, particularly as projected to a public audience, is central to my analysis. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore how these key stakeholders use the language of 
choice. This analysis shows that both disability and medical communities trade on this language 
to subtly persuade their readers, particularly those who may hold differing political and/or ethical 
positions. By evoking multiple meanings of choice in their statements, they promote their 
ideological perspectives. The disability communities frame the issues through a lens of 
“informed choice,” while the medical communities use a lens of healthcare consumerism, 
suggesting that patients have a range of options to choose as they wish. These deliberate word 
selections build upon the ever-present yet tacit conversation about abortion. The analysis 
identifies strategies that these stakeholders should implement in policy statements, given that 
both emerging technologies and current practice warrant new guidance. 
Methods 
Text Selection 
I examine the debate between the disability and medical communities using a purposive 
sample of policy statements. Both the disability and medical communities represent stakeholders 
in the matter of prenatal genetic screening and testing. Disability communities are diverse with 
regards to political and religious viewpoints and are not explicitly asking whether or not abortion 
should be legal, but rather whether individuals ought to be able to choose the traits of a particular 
fetus, or more precisely – given current technologies – to choose against certain traits. I have 
selected the medical communities because they remain the gatekeeper of pregnancy termination 
services and a valued profession with disciplinary power. 
PUBLIC CHOICES  86 
By design, policy statements represent a collective of opinions for their respective 
groups. I make no assertion that such texts provide a representative account of all people with 
disabilities or all medical professionals. Nonetheless, these documents convey a specific point-
of-view. These texts are not direct responses to each other; in fact, the disability communities’ 
statements likely do not intend to counter that of the medical communities’ or vice versa (e.g., 
the disability communities may have never read clinical practice guidelines about prenatal 
testing, or alternatively, the authors of the clinical practice guidelines may have never heard the 
messages of the disability communities). While these statements are displayed publicly and 
intended for a general audience, I suspect that the messages they convey are insulated rather than 
truly shared and exchanged. For the most part, the public gains access to these policy statements 
not directly, but rather filtered through the media or in how they inform clinical practices that 
impact patient care. 
Disability Rights Organization’s Policy Statement 
To explore the disability communities’ perspective on genetic testing, I use the Disabled 
People’s International (DPI) policy statement entitled Disabled People Speak on the New 
Genetics (2000). DPI is a network of disabled persons’ organizations that aims to promote the 
human rights of disabled persons by encouraging economic and social integration, representing 
constituents from 130 countries (Disabled People’s International [DPI], 2012). I selected this 
organization because of its cross-disability support, as opposed to a disability-specific 
organization, such as the Global Down Syndrome Foundation. While the topic of “new genetics” 
addresses issues related to genetic research and genetic technologies generally, the text provides 
specific language regarding prenatal screening and testing. This text provides little explanation 
about these perspectives so I supplement this primary text with work from disability rights 
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advocates and Disability Studies scholarship. Feminist Disability Studies scholar Asch (1999) 
highlights a critical evaluation of the offer of prenatal testing is necessary to promote 
reproductive autonomy, including legal abortion; in doing so, she crafts a critique of prenatal 
testing that is distinct from a pro-life stance. Broadly, Disability Studies scholarship advocates 
for reproductive autonomy (Klein, 2011; Ormond, Gill, Semik, & Kirschner, 2003; Piepmeier, 
2013; Saxton, 2006), including critical discussion about the implications for the meanings of 
family (Ginsburg & Rapp, 2013; Kent, 2000; Kittay & Kittay, 2000). 
Clinical Practice Guidelines 
In order to see how the medical communities have responded to the demands of disability 
communities, I use the Clinical Practice Guidelines of the Canadian College of Medical 
Geneticists (CCMG) and the Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada (SOSG) 
entitled Canadian Guidelines for Prenatal Diagnosis (Canadian College of Medical Geneticists 
and Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada [SOSG], 2001). The Society of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada is a foundation that supports education, research, 
and women’s healthcare. 
I also use the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) news 
releases related to this topic entitled ACOG's Screening Guidelines on Chromosomal 
Abnormalities What They Mean to Patients and Physicians (American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists Office of Communications [ACOG], 2007, May) and New Recommendations 
for Down Syndrome: Screening Should Be Offered to All Pregnant Women (ACOG, 2007, 
January). ACOG is a non-profit advocacy organization comprised of women’s healthcare 
physicians. I chose to examine this web-based communication as a primary text because of its 
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accessibility to the public, supplementing these texts with the practice guideline only available to 
members and those with subscriptions to the organization’s journal, Obstetrics & Gynecology. 
It is worth noting that medical professionals with specialized genetic training contributed 
to developing both sets of clinical practice guidelines. As Davis (2010) notes, genetic specialists 
– perhaps even more than other health professionals – hold autonomy with high regard. Davis 
suggests that this focus is at least in part due to the fact that the medical genetics community 
understands its historical connection to eugenics. Within the field, the focus on patient autonomy 
has led to the development of two central tenets: value-neutrality and nondirective counseling. 
Taken together, the value of a decision is solely based upon what is right for that particular 
patient, and providers should not try to influence a decision (Davis, 2010). While these 
fundamental tenets underpin these practice guidelines, they may have little significance to the 
majority of providers who do not have specialized genetic training but are involved with the 
delivery of information about prenatal tests. 
Data Analysis 
With the intent to provide both grounded and practical insights, this research addresses 
issues of language, power, and context. Discourse analysis is a qualitative research method that 
illuminates the ways in which language encapsulates values that reveals how language enacts 
particular perspectives and creates situated meanings (Gee, 2010). By examining texts with a set 
of guiding questions to interrogate the use of language, the analysis employed a form of directed 
content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Using ATLAS.ti 7™, the analysis explored the work 
of disability and medical communities’ statements differentiate their interests and claims from 
the abortion debate. 
Discussion & Interpretation 
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Extending Choice 
Within North America between 1960 and 1985, the public discourse articulated both 
motherhood and abortion as a “choice” (Condit, 1990). The language of choice surfaces in these 
texts about prenatal genetic screening and testing; however, the stakeholders extend the meaning 
of choice, embedding it within larger conversations about autonomy and consumerism. 
By appealing to an expanded conceptualization of choice, DPI may have been attempting 
to re-direct the public discourse away from abortion debates. DPI (2000) describes prenatal 
testing as lacking “informed choice” and suggesting “no free choice” can occur within the 
current medical context (p. 6). This understanding of choice is implicitly connected to bioethical 
understandings about autonomy, which outline that voluntariness, understanding, 
recommendation, and authorization are some of the key elements of informed consent 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 1994). Consistent with other Disability Studies scholarship (e.g., Asch 
& Wasserman, 2005; Bérubé, 1998), DPI suggests that medical practice fails to provide complete 
and accurate information about disability (understanding) and that society offers inadequate 
social supports for many families to raise a child with a disability (voluntariness). While 
bioethics specifically uses the term informed consent, DPI (2000) substitutes consent with 
choice: 
With respect to the impact of genetics on reproduction, we support women’s right 
to choose with respect to their pregnancies. However, we deplore the context in 
which these choices are made. There is no informed choice [emphasis added] as 
long as genetic counseling is directive and misinforms parents about the 
experience of disability. There can be no free choice as long as myths, fears, 
stereotypes of and discrimination against disabled people continues. There is no 
free choice if women are under social pressure to accept routine tests. There can 
be no real choice until women feel able to continue with a pregnancy knowing 
that they will be bringing their child into a welcoming society that provides 
comprehensive systems of support (p. 6). 
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DPI’s rhetorical construction centers prenatal testing as a conversation about autonomy more 
than about reproductive choices. They frame their argument to question prospective parents’ 
freedom to choose to accept or reject genetic testing independently of any decisions about 
pregnancy management. DPI indirectly acknowledges the evidence suggesting that knowledge 
about a particular trait itself does change prospective parents’ desire for their future baby, with 
92% and 58% of prospective parents terminating a pregnancy following a definitive diagnosis of 
Down syndrome and Klinefelter syndrome, respectively (Mansfield, Hopfer, & Marteau, 1999). 
The implicit question DPI raises is whether such information should have such an impact and 
why. 
DPI (2000) critiques multiple elements of informed consent throughout their policy 
statement. They argue that: most clinicians have a limited understanding about living with 
disability; stereotypes about disability further limit prospective parents’ understanding about 
whether or not to accept prenatal testing; social pressure to accept routine prenatal testing is 
coercive; and disability discrimination may make prospective parents feel unable to knowingly 
continue pregnancy and feel ill-equipped to raise a disabled child. This rhetorical shift to 
informed choice is a useful strategy to create discursive space for pro-choice allies. 
 The SOGC practice guidelines and ACOG news releases do not explicitly use the word 
“choice.” SOGC (2001) does describe program-level choices, “Different programs may choose 
different cut-offs [age-related risk calculations by which to determine whether amniocentesis 
would be offered] depending on local resources” (p. 3). This suggests a community-centered 
approach, implying flexibility between providers. While ACOG removes the language of choice, 
they nonetheless address the substantive issues of informed consent that DPI poses. They are 
explicit that such screening is not required or even a recommendation. To illustrate this, ACOG 
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(2007, May) quotes Dr. Driscoll, the primary author of the Practice Bulletin and an obstetrician-
gynecologist (who also has certifications in medical genetics): 
We are not recommending that all pregnant women be screened but rather we are 
recommending that all pregnant women be offered screening.  Physicians are 
ethically obligated to fully inform our patients of their healthcare options, 
including prenatal testing.  It is entirely up to the patient whether or not she 
wishes to be screened for fetal chromosomal abnormalities without judgment 
from their physician (para. 5; emphasis in original). 
 
ACOG asserts that prenatal testing involves decision-making on the part of each individual 
patient. Both SOGC and ACOG explicitly recognize an extension of choice beyond that of the 
abortion debate. SOGC suggests a consumer-driven choice, and ACOG stipulates that their 
change in the practice guidelines affords women with a greater range of options. In this manner, 
these medical communities draw upon values about healthcare consumerism, where choice 
implies the consumer’s ability to choose whichever tests from a range of healthcare services. 
DPI may have reservations about the offer of prenatal testing that ACOG proposes, 
especially given the pressures that may accompany it. While DPI actively engages the language 
of choice, both SOGC and ACOG successfully evade its use. ACOG discusses informed consent 
at least minimally by acknowledging some of the bioethical issues at stake, but SOGC does not 
specifically address these. 
Murky Metaphors 
DPI uses explicit metaphors connecting genetics to eugenics and to mass destruction. The 
repetitive use of genetics in conjunction with strategically placed references to elimination, 
manipulation, and human rights violations blurs any preconceived notion of genetics as distinct 
from eugenics. While they make no attempt to define eugenics, they capture the underpinning 
values of eugenics. In particular, they try to take the negative association with eugenics and 
import it into the conversation about such testing. DPI (2000) only uses the word “eugenics” 
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twice (on pages 3 and 5) – but these more subtle rhetorical connections are perhaps more 
effective: 
Human genetics poses a threat to us because while cures and palliatives are 
promised, what is actually being offered are genetic tests for characteristics 
perceived as undesirable. This is not about treating illness or impairment but 
about eliminating or manipulating foetuses which may not be acceptable for a 
variety of reasons. These threaten our human rights (p. 3). 
 
DPI suggests that if the purpose of prenatal screening is to eliminate particular fetuses, then the 
practice of such screening sends the message that the lives of people with disabilities are not 
worth living; they imply that our human rights are threatened when diversity is neither valued 
nor tolerated. They highlight that genetic testing provides a mechanism to identify differences in 
order to be eliminated: “What we do oppose is genetic cleansing, driven by profit motive and 
social efficiency, informed by prejudice against disabled people and carried out in the name of 
cure or treatment” (DPI, 2000, p. 5). DPI conveys a variant of ethnic cleansing, where disability 
is analogous to ethnicity. Of particular significance is the notion that a powerful social group 
tries to eliminate another less powerful group; however, they strategically avoid explicit 
reference to the actors. 
Consistent use of first-person, plural pronouns may help the audience identify with the 
victim, and then the audience can substitute a social player of any kind (i.e., biomedicine, 
economics, politics, etc.) as the agent with power. This rhetorical move is different from 
traditional metaphors of pro-life advocates who liken individual doctors to Nazi war criminals 
(Smith, 1995). The ambiguous actors leave interpretation to the audience, which may be a useful 
strategy. From within this rich discursive space, most people can identify a powerful actor and an 
oppressed one. In this manner, DPI focuses on genetic testing and its implications rather than the 
implications of pregnancy termination. Specifically, they highlight how genetic testing identifies 
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traits perceived as undesirable with the intent to eliminate or to manipulate, as opposed to 
abortion rhetoric that often frames women or doctors in a negative light. 
DPI (2000) also makes a direct association to nuclear power, stating 
Nuclear energy is a source of life and a cause of death. If given an opportunity to 
express their opinion surely the victims of Nagasaki or Chernobyl would have 
fought for stricter regulation of the practical use of that new scientific knowledge. 
The same is true of the revolutionary developments in human genetics (p. 3). 
 
While DPI makes explicit connections to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
during World War II, DPI leaves some ambiguity and does not define either the victims or the 
agents with control of the genetics. As such, DPI creates a recurrent theme for the need of social 
responsibility in science that again situates their concern on the social dimensions that may make 
genetics problematic, rather than individual actors or individual choices. 
The medical communities use implicit or unintended metaphors. Neither ACOG nor 
SOGC adopt any of DPI’s metaphors. They also do not take the opportunity to acknowledge any 
social factors that may make genetic testing or the offer of such testing problematic. Likely 
trying to differentiate between tests that identify risk for a particular condition (i.e., screening) 
from tests that identify specific genetic traits, ACOG (2007, January) avoids using the term 
“genetic testing” and instead, they consistently use “screening”: 
According to the new guidelines, the goal is to offer screening tests with high 
detection rates and low false positive rates that also provide patients with 
diagnostic testing options if the screening test indicates that the patient is at an 
increased risk for having a child with Down syndrome (para. 5; emphasis added). 
 
In contrast, SOGC (2001) attempts to avoid using metaphorical language by defining terms at the 
outset: “These guidelines apply to non-invasive screening techniques (including maternal serum 
screening and ultrasound) and to invasive techniques (including amniocentesis and chorionic 
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villus sampling)” (p. 2). Perhaps unintentionally, the medical communities fail to recognize the 
metaphors at play when using the term screening. 
At its core, screening is about identifying and examining particular characteristics, but in 
definition, the purposes have evolved. Historically, the purpose of screening was to separate out 
and remove the unwanted (like with gold or coal). The idea of separating out and removing the 
unwanted is exactly the message DPI suggests is morally questionable in relationship to prenatal 
tests. 
According to Morabia and Zhang (2004), the United States Army implemented one of the 
earliest screening programs in 1917, using paper-based tests to identify potential recruits with 
psychiatric conditions as unfit for service. Nowadays, screening has become ubiquitous with 
healthcare; such that most people understand the purpose is to identify health conditions in 
people without signs or symptoms with the hopes of early treatment and management. 
The medical communities draw upon what have become familiar discourses related to 
cervical cancer (e.g., a Pap smear) and/or sexually-transmitted infection screenings (e.g., HIV 
testing), and their words reflect this dominant understanding: “ACOG revised its guidelines that 
now recommend offering fetal chromosomal screening to all pregnant women, regardless of age, 
because of improvements in low-risk, noninvasive screening methods” (2007, May, para. 1; 
emphasis added). Similarly, SOGC (2001) states, “maternal age alone is a relatively poor 
predictor of fetal chromosomal abnormalities. Where facilities exist for additional screening 
methods, such as maternal serum screening, estimation of risk based on maternal age in isolation 
may not be appropriate” (pg. 2; emphasis added). 
ACOG’s use of “screening to all pregnant women” might be viewed as an appeal to 
justice. This may be a useful rhetorical strategy, as the appeal to this distinct moral principle 
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relates to different issues (i.e., autonomy relates to the decision to have a genetic test, whereas 
justice relates to access to the test). More central to this issue, however, is the public’s 
understanding of screening; in particular, what is the benefit of screening? With cancer 
screening, the purpose is to identify cancer early, so that intervention (e.g., chemotherapy or 
tumor removal) is possible; alternatively, with sexually-transmitted infection screening, the 
purpose is to identify the condition to begin treatment. Even in the absence of available cures, 
preventing transmission (e.g., mother-to-child, partner-to-partner) is an understood benefit. 
Particularly in a public sphere, the medical communities’ use of the term screening in 
relationship to prenatal genetic testing may be problematic, because screening and prevention in 
this arena implies eliminating undesirable traits and preventing the lives of those with such traits. 
Missing Action 
At present, there is no cure or treatment for a prenatal genetic diagnosis. The most 
recognizable benefit gained from testing is knowledge. Knowledge gained can reassure 
prospective parents about a “healthy” future child, give time to prepare for a child with a 
disability, or provide the opportunity to interrupt the pregnancy. The medical communities likely 
do not want to convey the message that pregnancy termination is even a potential benefit. As a 
profession, obstetricians and gynecologists are intimately involved with family planning and 
pregnancy management, including pregnancy termination. Given the contentious political-legal 
environment, practice guidelines may be reluctant to address abortion. Some may fear that such 
attention might ultimately constrain access to abortion services. 
SOGC makes no reference to abortion as a potential action following these prenatal 
genetic tests. Similarly, ACOG circumvents any discussion about pregnancy termination and 
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makes no reference to abortion in these news releases. Thus, these medical communities present 
screening for fetal chromosomal abnormalities as quite separate from pregnancy termination. 
The news releases are intended for a broad public audience with a diversity of beliefs and 
values held about both prenatal testing and abortion, so ACOG’s representation is likely 
appropriate. However, if the potential relationship between prenatal testing and abortion is not 
conveyed, then the public is largely dependent upon patient-clinician interactions to make this 
connection. Unfortunately, this approach may not promote education about the practice of 
prenatal testing. As Rapp (1996) discusses in relationship to “positive” genetic diagnoses using 
amniocentesis, some prospective parents may misinterpret or misunderstand this tacit connection 
between screening and pregnancy termination. 
Not only is the word “abortion” unsaid, ACOG substitutes “20th week of pregnancy” to 
address legal implications associated with the offer. Given the time needed to obtain results from 
invasive testing, the 20th week of pregnancy encroaches on the beginning of many states’ 
restrictions of pregnancy termination. For example, the original news release highlights: 
The new ACOG guidelines recommend that all pregnant women consider less 
invasive screening options for assessing their risk for Down syndrome, a common 
disorder that is caused by an extra chromosome and can result in congenital heart 
defects and mental retardation. Screening for Down syndrome should occur 
before the 20th week of pregnancy” (ACOG, 2007, January, para. 2; emphasis 
added). 
 
They use this tactic in the subsequent news release, as well. While this may help to distance their 
guidelines from some audience members, they also seemingly decontextualize relevant facts 
about prenatal genetic testing. Specifically, they do not acknowledge that such testing can lead 
prospective parents towards a series of pregnancy decisions that may result in pregnancy 
termination. Press and Browner (1997) discuss how many pregnant women understand routine 
prenatal care, including prenatal genetic screening, as beneficial. In fact, many believe that such 
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care helps to ensure a healthy baby. Additionally, Press and Browner (1994) suggest that the 
topic of abortion is absent from patient education materials. Rather than obscuring the potential 
connection between such testing and pregnancy management decisions, I argue that ACOG 
should make greater efforts to develop and to promote health education related to prenatal testing 
and to further respond to DPI’s critiques about physicians failing to fully inform patients. 
Not surprisingly, DPI references abortion. The repeated and strategic use of the word 
“choice” may implicitly bring to mind abortion rhetoric, and their use of the word “abortion” 
may further substantiate the connection. Most of this usage specifically refers to the current legal 
status of such services. For example, “We are threatened by abortion laws which discriminate 
against the birth of disabled children” (DPI, 2000, p. 4). This explicit connection between 
abortion and law may be particularly problematic for those concerned about preserving the 
availability of legal abortions. If DPI aims to promote further public discussion about whether or 
not the practice of prenatal testing should continue as is, then perhaps using the word “abortion” 
in conjunction with “law” should be limited. This language use may surface underlying fears 
about altering the legal status of abortion laws, which may alienate audience members who are 
sympathetic to their interests. Furthermore, those reluctant to draw attention to politically 
susceptible abortion laws may not engage in dialogue about prenatal testing. 
Conclusions 
Given the ever-growing availability of genetic testing, including the application of cell-
free fetal DNA analysis (Hahn & Holzgreve, 2002), this realm of public policy will become 
increasingly important to healthcare and public health. Committee opinions about non-invasive 
methods of prenatal genetic diagnosis have been recently published (Devers et al., 2012; 
Langlois, Brock, & Genetics Committee, 2013; Schaefer & Mendelsohn, 2013), so it is 
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foreseeable that medical communities craft new practice guidelines within a short timeline. This 
creates an opportunity for disability rights organizations to draft policy statements addressing 
these new technologies. Even if such statements are completely disregarded by existing medical 
establishments, connecting with the general public may create opportunities to educate others 
about disability, to identify new allies wary of mass implementation and widespread adoption of 
prenatal genetic testing, or to develop critical consumers aware of the potential erosion of 
informed healthcare choices. In so doing, disability communities ensure their representation as a 
stakeholder in this ongoing public issue. 
By directing the conversation to address specific issues at stake with prenatal genetic 
testing, disability communities can help to continue providing more balanced coverage of 
disability representations to the public and to guide clinical practice. However, much of the 
critiques of prenatal testing have come from disability-specific organizations. Given that 
emerging technological advances allow prenatal tests to identify a wider range of genetic 
conditions, I think that future recommendations should increasingly reflect cross-disability 
alliances. Coordinated, unified efforts − across disability communities and with allies − are 
needed to influence this public conversation. This analysis suggests that disability communities 
must delve into precisely how clinicians are misinforming or not providing informed consent in 
order to highlight mechanisms to improve upon current practice. Additionally, disability 
communities have to make efforts to engage directly with prospective parents who may need and 
want the information that only disability communities can provide. Publishing position 
statements on the Internet alone is insufficient; efforts must be made to enter mass media, 
including newspapers, health education materials, radio, etc. In order to make a public case for 
diversity, disability communities need to engage with local healthcare systems, media outlets, 
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and beyond. By utilizing multiple mechanisms, disability communities can help to transform a 
private, patient-provider encounter into a public conversation. I contend that this is the best way 
to enhance reproductive autonomy and to further promote disability as valued diversity. 
Through examining policy statements, this analysis reveals how the deliberate word 
choices may also re-shape conversations about abortion. The disability and medical communities 
actively extend the notion of choice beyond that of abortion rhetoric. Disability communities 
transform informed consent into informed choice, while medical communities focus the 
conversation on healthcare consumerism. By drawing upon this notion of healthcare 
consumerism, future policy statements from disability communities may want to make space to 
address other related, but equally relevant issues, like home- and community-based services, 
disability representations in health education materials, and education and employment 
opportunities. These issues can constrain prospective parents’ understandings about the 
capability of a child with a disability, and they also build upon the notion that individuals should 
have a range of available options (e.g., not only the option to choose a child with a disability, but 
also the option to raise such a child in their own home and community; disability representations 
that show people with disabilities flourishing in their lives, rather than predominantly focused on 
cures and treatments; people with disabilities who have equal access to a diverse set of education 
and employment opportunities as their peers without disabilities). 
While the medical communities did not adopt this language of choice, some address the 
issue of informed consent. However, they do not readily address the relationship between 
prenatal genetic testing and pregnancy management. In this rhetorical move, they neglect the 
disability communities’ critique that a woman’s choice to have or not have prenatal genetic 
testing should reflect what parents think is the purpose of testing. Disability communities use 
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mixed-metaphors, which creates multiple opportunities to engage their audience, and given that 
the audience likely comes from diverse political and moral backgrounds, this technique may be a 
useful strategy. On the other side, medical communities, perhaps unintentionally, use the word 
“screening,” which taps into multiple meanings – given their equally diverse audience, this may 
prove to be problematic. The notion of screening with the purpose to eliminate elevates the 
existing concerns of disability communities. I would not say that the word “screening” is itself 
the problem, but rather I contend that medical communities should be more transparent about the 
potential connection between such prenatal tests and pregnancy management choices. While I 
recognize that medical communities may be reluctant to address abortion head-on in a practice 
guideline, its absence suggests that the information available during decision-making is vague; 
excluding abortion from the practice guideline fuels existing concerns about public 
misunderstandings and constrained reproductive choices. Medicine is a model for other health 
professionals and possesses the power to influence policy, practice, and patient education. 
Therefore, I would argue that medical communities have a responsibility to the public to be open 
about abortion. While this may initiate unwanted public conversations about reproductive 
autonomy, I think it also presents an opportunity to ensure that practice guidelines reflect the 
need for providers to discuss with their patients that pregnancy termination is a potential 
outcome of such testing. 
By looking at the rhetoric of both the disability and medical communities together, we 
see that public conversations about prenatal genetic testing are notably complex. Both groups are 
similarly entangled in multiple discourses and perhaps unintentionally engaged in issues 
unrelated to the task of their policy statements. Those trying to covey messages about prenatal 
genetic testing to the public need to be mindful not just of the science, but also of the rhetorical 
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elements at play − particularly how the rhetoric provides a connection to values and assumptions 
that likely influence the way in which the audience interprets what is being said. Careful use of 
language can help to navigate the competing discourses and to realize shared values in order to 
answer fundamental questions: should prenatal genetic testing be offered, for which conditions, 
and if so, how? 
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